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as a way to improve public schooling, but the justiﬁcation for that position
is largely based on theoretical ideas. Until quite recently there was little
evidence on public school responsiveness to competition from private
schools, other public school districts, or charter schools, and empirical re-
search remains quite thin. Under most conceivable scenarios of expanded
choice, even with private school vouchers, the public school system will still
remain the primary supplier of schooling. Therefore, it is important to
know what might happen to quality and outcomes in the remaining public
schools. This research is designed to provide insights about that from an
analysis of how public schools respond to competition from other public
schools.
The empirical analysis has two major components. First, estimates of av-
erage school quality diﬀerences in metropolitan areas across Texas are com-
pared to the amount of public school competition in each. At least for the
largest metropolitan areas, the degree of competition is positively related to
performance of the public schools. Second, the narrower impact of metro-
politan area competition on teacher quality is investigated. Because teacher
quality has been identiﬁed as one of the most important determinants of
student outcomes, it is logical to believe that the eﬀects of competition on
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Does Public School Competition
Aﬀect Teacher Quality?
Eric A. Hanushek and Steven G. Rivkinhiring, retention, monitoring, and other personnel practices would be one
of the most important aspects of any force toward improving public school
quality. The results, although far from conclusive, suggest that competition
raises teacher quality and improves the overall quality of education. 
Prior to the analysis of Texas public schools we brieﬂy consider the vari-
ous margins of competition for public schools. Although many simply as-
sume that expanded availability of alternatives will lead to higher public
school quality, the institutional structure of public schools raises some
questions about the strength of any response.
1.1 The Margins of Competition
Competition for public schools may emanate from a variety of sources.
Neighborhood selection places families in particular public school districts
and speciﬁc school catchment areas within districts. Families also choose
whether to opt out of the public schools and send their children to parochial
or other private school alternatives.1 Although these choices have operated
for a long time, recent policy innovations have expanded competition
within the public school sector. The ability to attend school in neighboring
districts, charter schools, and private schools with public funding enhances
choice and potentially imposes additional competitive pressures on public
schools.
Most of the attention to private schools has concentrated on student per-
formance in Catholic schools.2 The literature on Catholic school perfor-
mance is summarized in Neal (1998) and Grogger and Neal (2000). The ev-
idence has generally indicated that Catholic schools on average outperform
public schools.3This superiority seems clearest in urban settings, where dis-
advantaged students face fewer options than others.
Our main interest, however, centers on the reactions of public schools to
the private sector. In an important article about the impact of private
schools on schools in the public sector, Hoxby (1994) demonstrates that
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1. Magnet schools have also existed for a long time. However, their small numbers, targeted
curricula, and frequent use of entrance examinations limit the extent to which they provide
competition for other public schools. Moreover, because they are often introduced to meet
school desegregation objectives, choice is frequently limited by racial quotas (Armor 1995).
2. Currently, almost 90 percent of all students attend public elementary and secondary
schools. This percentage has been stable for some time, although the exact character of the al-
ternative private schooling has changed. The percentage of private school students in Catholic
schools has declined, whereas other religious based schooling has increased to oﬀset this de-
cline. Nonetheless, adequate data on non-Catholic schools have not been readily available.
3. As has been recognized since some of the earliest work on the topic (Coleman, Hoﬀer, and
Kilgore 1982), it is diﬃcult to separate performance of the private schools from pure selection
phenomena. A variety of alternative approaches have dealt with the selection problem, and a
rough summary of the results of those eﬀorts is that there remains a small advantage from at-
tending Catholic schools. Grogger and Neal (2000) suggest, however, that there is no advan-
tage to attending private elite schools—a surprising result given the high average tuitions.public schools in areas that have larger concentrations of Catholic schools
perform better than those facing less private competition. This analysis
provides the ﬁrst consistent evidence suggesting that public schools react to
outside competition.
The most important element of competition comes from other public
schools. Speciﬁcally, households can choose the speciﬁc jurisdiction and
school district, à la Tiebout (1956), by their choice of residential location.
Although adjustment is costly, these choices permit individuals to seek
high-quality schools if they wish. Residential location decisions are of
course complicated, involving job locations, availability of various kinds of
housing, school costs and quality, and availability of other governmental
services. Nonetheless, given choice opportunities plus voting responses,
this model suggests pressure on schools and districts to alter their behavior;
competitive alternatives that lead families to choose other schools would
yield downward pressure on housing prices and perhaps even an enrollment
decline.
The ensuing public pressures might be expected to lead administrators
and teachers to respond. For example, job performance may aﬀect a super-
intendent’s ability to move to another district or a principal’s autonomy or
ability to remain in a school. Better performance by teachers may make the
school more attractive to other high-quality teachers, thereby improving
working conditions.
Oﬀsetting forces may, nonetheless, mute any competitive pressures. The
current structure of many school systems including tenure for teachers and
administrators likely lessens the impact of competitive forces. Institution-
ally, district survival is virtually guaranteed under plausible changes in the
competitive environment.
The empirical analysis of Borland and Howsen (1992) and its extension
and reﬁnement in Hoxby (2000) investigate public school responses to
Tiebout forces using the concentration of students in school districts within
metropolitan areas as a measure of competition. Borland and Howsen ﬁnd
that metropolitan areas with less public school competition have lower
school quality. Noting, however, that the existing distribution of families
across districts reﬂects endogenous reactions to school quality, Hoxby pur-
sues alternative strategies to identify the causal impact of concentrations.
She ﬁnds that consideration of endogeneity increases the estimated impact
of competition on the performance of schools. Our analysis builds on these
speciﬁcations of public school competition.
The general consideration of Tiebout competition, however, leaves many
questions open. For example, it is not obvious how to deﬁne the “competi-
tive market.” Although the district is the fundamental operating and
decision-making unit in most states, districts themselves can be very large
and heterogeneous. This heterogeneity could lead to competition, and re-
sponses, that are more local in nature—say, at the school rather than the
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suggest that school quality diﬀerences are capitalized into housing prices at
the individual school rather than the district level. This ambiguity motivates
our use of alternative measures of the level of competition.
Much recent attention has focused on more radical forms of competition
such as vouchers or charter schools. Again, whereas most debate focuses on
the performance of these alternatives, our interest is the reaction of public
schools to these competitive alternatives. With the exception of Hoxby
(chap. 8 in this volume), however, little consideration has been given to the
actions of public schools.
1.2 The Importance of Teacher Quality
The diﬃculty of identifying and measuring school quality constitutes a
serious obstacle to learning more about the eﬀects of competition. A sub-
stantial body of work on the determinants of student achievement has
failed to yield any simple descriptions of the key school and teacher factors.
Although class size and other variables may signiﬁcantly aﬀect outcomes
for speciﬁc populations and grades, ﬁnancial measures (spending per pupil
and teacher salaries) and real resources (teacher experience and degrees,
class size, facilities, and administration) do not appear to capture much of
the overall variation in school or teacher quality (Hanushek 1986, 1997).4
On the other hand, schools and teachers have been shown to be dramat-
ically diﬀerent in their eﬀects on students. A variety of researchers have
looked at variations among teachers in a ﬁxed eﬀect framework and have
found large diﬀerences in teacher performance (see, e.g., Hanushek 1971,
1992; Murnane 1975; Armor et al. 1976; Murnane and Phillips 1981). The
general approach has been to estimate value added achievement models
and to assess whether or not performance gains diﬀer systematically across
teachers. It is important to note that value added models control for diﬀer-
ences in entering achievement and thus remove a number of potential
sources of bias, including diﬀerences in past performance and school fac-
tors, individual ability, and so forth. In every instance of such estimation,
large diﬀerences have been found. Of particular signiﬁcance for the work
here, these diﬀerences have generally been weakly related to the common
measures of teachers and classrooms found in the more traditional econo-
metric estimation.
These analyses have not, however, conclusively identiﬁed the impacts of
diﬀerent teachers. Because parents frequently set out to choose not just spe-
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4. Although parts of this discussion have generated controversy—largely over the policy
conclusions that might be drawn—none of the discussion has suggested that any of these re-
source measures are good indicators of overall school quality. The focus in the discussion has
been whether policy changes in any of these measures could be expected to yield positive
eﬀects on student performance. See, for example, the paper by Burtless (1996).ciﬁc schools but also speciﬁc teachers within schools, the makeup of indi-
vidual classrooms may not be random. This possibility is compounded by
two other inﬂuences. First, teachers and principals also enter into a selec-
tion process that matches individual teachers with groupings of children.5
Second, if the composition of the other children in the classroom is impor-
tant—that is, if there are important peer group eﬀects on achievement—the
gains in an individual classroom will partially reﬂect the characteristics of
the children and not just the teacher assigned to the classroom.6 These con-
siderations suggest a possibility that classroom outcome diﬀerences reﬂect
more than just variations in teacher quality.
A recent paper by Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2001) uses matched
panel data for individual students and schools to estimate diﬀerences in
teacher quality that are not contaminated by other factors. Because that
work forms the basis for the investigation here, it is useful to understand the
exact nature of it. The authors use a value added model that compares the
pattern of school average gains in achievement for three successive cohorts
as they progress through grades ﬁve and six. The value added model, by
conditioning on prior achievement, eliminates unmeasured family and
school factors that aﬀect the level of beginning achievement for a grade and
permits concentration on just the ﬂow of educational inputs over the spe-
ciﬁc grade. The analysis then introduces ﬁxed eﬀects for individual schools
and for speciﬁc grades in each school, allowing for eﬀects of stable student
ability and background diﬀerences, of overall quality of schools, and of the
eﬀectiveness of continuing curricular and programmatic elements for indi-
vidual grades. This basic modeling provides what is essentially a prediction
of achievement growth for individuals based on each one’s past perfor-
mance and speciﬁc schooling circumstances. The central consideration,
then, is how much changes in teachers aﬀect the observed patterns of stu-
dent achievement growth within each school.7
This analysis shows that cohort diﬀerences in school average gains rise
signiﬁcantly as teacher turnover increases. By controlling for other poten-
tially confounding inﬂuences, the methodology generates a lower bound es-
timate of the variance in teacher quality based on within-school diﬀerences
in test score gains among the cohorts.
The estimation of “pure” teacher quality diﬀerences reveals that the vari-
ation in teacher quality within schools (i.e., ignoring all variation across
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5. Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2001b) show that teachers both leave schools and select new
districts based on the achievement and racial composition of the schools.
6. Hanushek et al. (forthcoming) and Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002) show that peer
characteristics related to achievement and race inﬂuence individual student achievement.
7. The analysis does not look at the achievement growth in individual classrooms, because
that could confound individual student placement in speciﬁc classrooms with diﬀerences in
teacher skills. Therefore, it aggregates students across classrooms in a speciﬁc grade, eﬀectively
instrumenting with grade to avoid selection eﬀects. Even if we had wished to pursue individ-
ual classrooms, however, we could not because of data limitations.schools) is large in Texas elementary schools. One standard deviation of
teacher quality—for example, moving from the median to the 84th percentile
of the teacher quality distribution—increases the annual growth of student
achievement by at least 0.11 standard deviations, and probably by substan-
tially more. This magnitude implies, for example, that having such an 84th
percentile teacher for ﬁve years in a row rather than a 50th percentile teacher
would be suﬃcient to eliminate the average performance gap between poor
students (those eligible for free or reduced lunch) and nonpoor students.
Evidence on the importance of teacher quality forms the basis for a major
segment of the empirical analysis here. Speciﬁcally, if the degree of local
competition is important, it should be possible to detect its impact on teacher
quality by examining performance variation along with the amount of local
competition across the state of Texas. In particular, it would be surprising for
competition to exert a substantial eﬀect on students without inﬂuencing the
quality of teaching, and investigating these eﬀects provides information
about the mechanism behind any observed impacts of competition.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
We investigate how varying amounts of public school competition in the
classic Tiebout sense aﬀect student performance and the hiring of teachers.
It is important to note that our eﬀorts are not general. We leave aside many
of the issues discussed previously and in the other papers of this volume
about possible details and dimensions of competition and concentrate en-
tirely on issues of academic performance across broadly competitive areas.
Nonetheless, the importance of this topic for individual labor market out-
comes and for the politics of schools justiﬁes the choice.
The empirical work exploits the rich data set on student performance of
the University of Texas at Dallas Texas Schools Project. Because Texas is a
large and varied state, a wide range of local circumstances is presented. In-
deed, there are twenty-seven separate metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
in Texas. These areas, described in table 1.1, vary considerably in size and
ability to mount eﬀective competition across districts. The basic Tiebout
model assumes a wide variety of jurisdictional choices such that people can
choose among alternative public service provision while retaining ﬂexibility
in housing quality and commuting choices. Clearly, the smaller MSAs of
Texas oﬀer limited eﬀective choice in all dimensions, so it will be interesting
to contrast results across the various areas of the state.
We employ the Texas Schools Project data ﬁrst to estimate overall qual-
ity diﬀerences between MSAs and to compare these results with the degree
of public school competition. Following that, we investigate whether or not
competition raises the quality of teaching.
As suggested by the previous discussions, this analysis is best thought of
as a reduced-form investigation. We do not observe the underlying decision-
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the competition facing individual schools and districts. Instead we use ag-
gregate indicators of potential competition from public schools and concen-
trate on whether or not there are systematic patterns to student outcomes.
1.3.1 The Texas Database
The data used in this paper come from the data development activity of
the UTD Texas Schools Project.8Its extensive data on student performance
are compiled for all public school students in Texas, allowing us to use the
universe of students in the analyses. We use fourth-, ﬁfth-, and sixth-grade
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Table 1.1 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in Texas
1997 Density Population Change Number Number of
Population (persons per 1990–97 of Elementary
Metropolitan Area (1000s) square mile) (%) Districts Schools
Houston 3,852 651 15.9 45 699
Dallas 3,127 505 16.8 77 590
Fort Worth-Arlington 1,556 533 14.4 37 311
San Antonio 1,511 454 14.1 25 318
Austin-San Marcos 1,071 253 26.6 29 210
El Paso 702 693 18.6 9 137
McAllen-Edinburg-
Mission 511 326 33.2 15 121
Corpus Christi 387 253 10.6 20 96
Beaumont-Port Arthur 375 174 3.8 16 72
Brownsville-Harlingen-
San Benito 321 354 23.3 10 81
Killeen-Temple 300 142 17.4 14 63
Galveston-Texas City 243 609 11.8 9 64
Odessa-Midland 243 135 7.9 2 28
Lubbock 231 256 3.6 8 57
Brazoria 225 163 17.6 8 48
Amarillo 208 114 11.0 5 59
Longview-Marshall 208 118 7.5 20 44
Waco 203 195 7.3 18 58
Laredo 183 55 37.5 4 53
Tyler 167 180 10.2 8 40
Wichita Falls 137 89 5.2 9 35
Bryan-College Station 133 227 9.1 2 18
Texarkana 123 82 2.7 13 24
Abilene 121 133 1.5 5 39
San Angelo 103 67 4.3 6 32
Sherman-Denison 102 109 6.9 13 30
Victoria 82 93 10.3 4 21
8. The UTD Texas Schools Project has been developed and directed by John Kain. Working
with the Texas Education Agency (TEA), this project has combined a number of diﬀerent datadata for three cohorts of students: fourth-graders in 1993, 1994, and 1995.
Each cohort contributes two years of test score gains. Students who switch
public schools within the state of Texas can be followed just as those who
remain in the same school or district, a characteristic we use in our analysis.
The Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS), which is administered
each spring, is a criterion-referenced test used to evaluate student mastery
of grade-speciﬁc subject matter. We focus on test results for mathematics,
the subject most closely linked with future labor market outcomes. We
transform all test results into standardized scores with a mean of zero and
variance equal to one. The bottom 1 percent of test scores and the top and
bottom 1 percent of test score gains are trimmed from the sample in order
to reduce measurement error. Participants in bilingual or special education
programs are also excluded from the sample because of the diﬃculty in
measuring school and teacher characteristics for these students.
The empirical analysis considers only students attending public school in
one of the twenty-seven MSAs in Texas (identiﬁed in table 1.1). A substan-
tial majority of all Texas public school students attend schools in one of
these MSAs. Each MSA is deﬁned as a separate education market, and
measures of competition are constructed for each. The analysis is restricted
to MSAs because of the diﬃculty of deﬁning school markets for rural com-
munities. Below we discuss potential problems associated with deﬁning ed-
ucation markets in this way.
1.3.2 Competition and School Quality
How will public school competition aﬀect the provision of education? Al-
though Tiebout-type forces would be expected to raise the eﬃciency of
schooling, it is not clear that more competition will necessarily result in
higher school quality. If wealth diﬀerences or other factors related to school
ﬁnancing lead to more resources in areas with less competition, the eﬃ-
ciency eﬀects of competition could be oﬀset by resource diﬀerences. There-
fore we consider diﬀerences in both school quality and school eﬃciency
across metropolitan areas.
A second important issue is precisely how to deﬁne the relevant compe-
tition. The importance of district administrators in allocating funds, deter-
mining curriculum, hiring teachers, and making a variety of other decisions
suggests that much if not most of the eﬀects of competition should operate
at the district level. However, anecdotal evidence on school choice provides
strong support for the notion that parents actively choose among schools
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sources to compile an extensive data set on schools, teachers, and students. Demographic in-
formation on students and teachers is taken from the Public Education Information Manage-
ment System (PEIMS), which is TEA’s statewide educational database. Test score results are
stored in a separate database maintained by TEA and must be merged with the student data
on the basis of unique student identiﬁers. Further descriptions of the database can be found in
Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2001).within urban and large suburban school districts, consistent with the view
that principals and teachers exert substantial inﬂuence on the quality of ed-
ucation. This anecdotal information is reinforced by the aforementioned re-
search on housing capitalization.
We treat the basis for competition as an empirical question. In the estima-
tion, we conduct parallel analyses where competition is measured on the ba-
sis of the concentration of students both in schools and separately in districts.
Although Hoxby (2000) provides the empirical context within which to
place this study of school eﬃciency, the methodology employed here is
much closer to the work by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) on inter-
industry wage diﬀerences. Just as interindustry wage diﬀerences reﬂect both
worker heterogeneity and industry factors, interschool or district diﬀer-
ences in student performance reﬂect both student heterogeneity and school
factors. However, a comparison of wage diﬀerences for a worker who
switches industries or of achievement diﬀerences for a student who switches
schools eﬀectively eliminates problems introduced by the heterogeneity of
workers or students. In this way the availability of matched panel data fa-
cilitates the identiﬁcation of sector eﬀects.
Equation (1) describes a value added model of learning for student i in
grade g in MSA m at time t:
(1)  Achievementigmt   familyi   familyigt   MSAm   errorigmt, 
where the change in achievement in grade g equals test score in grade g mi-
nus test score in grade g – 1. 
The overall strategy concentrates on estimation of metropolitan area
ﬁxed eﬀects (MSAm) for each of the twenty-seven MSAs in Texas. Impor-
tantly, this model removes all ﬁxed family, individual, and other inﬂuences
on learning (familyi) as well as time-varying changes (familyigt) in family in-
come, community type (urban or suburban), speciﬁc year eﬀects, and the
eﬀect of moving prior to the school year (students may or may not move
prior to ﬁfth grade).9
In this model of student ﬁxed eﬀects in achievement gains, the MSA qual-
ity ﬁxed eﬀects are identiﬁed by students who switch metropolitan areas.
These twenty-seven MSA ﬁxed eﬀects provide an index of average school
quality for the set of metropolitan areas. Although most of the variation in
school quality likely occurs within an MSA, such variation is ignored be-
cause of the focus on competition diﬀerences among MSAs.10 Importantly,
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9. The empirical speciﬁcation with the emphasis on the eﬀects of moving reﬂects our prior
analysis that shows an average decline in learning growth in the year of a move (Hanushek,
Kain, and Rivkin 2001a).
10. The choice of individual schools does introduce one complication. The average eﬀects
will be weighted by the student choices of schools within metropolitan areas instead of the
overall distribution of students across an area. Our econometric estimates assume that any di-
ﬀerential selectivity of schools within metropolitan areas (after allowing for individual ﬁxed
eﬀects for movers) is uncorrelated with the level of competition.by removing student ﬁxed eﬀects in achievement gains, this approach eﬀec-
tively eliminates much of the confounding inﬂuences of student hetero-
geneity present in analyses based on cross-sectional data.
Nevertheless, we do not believe that students switch districts at random,
and changes in circumstances not captured by the student ﬁxed eﬀects may
dictate the characteristics of the destination school as well as aﬀecting stu-
dent performance. For example, families who experience job loss or divorce
may relocate to inferior districts, whereas families who experience eco-
nomic improvements may tend to relocate to better districts.11If the limited
number of time-varying covariates does not account for such changes in
family circumstances, the estimates of metropolitan area school quality will
reﬂect both true quality diﬀerences and diﬀerences in family circumstances.
However, even if the rankings of metropolitan area average quality are
contaminated, regressions of these rankings on the degree of competition
may still provide consistent estimates of competition eﬀects as long as the
omitted student and family eﬀects are not related to the degree of competi-
tion. The fact that mobility across regions is most importantly linked to job
relocations and less to seeking speciﬁc schools or other amenities certainly
mitigates any problems resulting from nonrandom mobility (Hanushek,
Kain, and Rivkin 2001a). On the other hand, other factors, including
school resources, that may be correlated with the measures of competition
may confound the estimated eﬀects of competition on school quality and,
more importantly, on school eﬃciency. We do include average class size as
a proxy for school eﬃciency. Although average class size captures at least a
portion of any diﬀerence in resources, there is a good chance that inﬂuences
of confounding factors remain.12
Two other important issues more speciﬁc to the study of school compe-
tition are the measurement of the degree of competition and the identiﬁca-
tion of separate public school markets. Following general analyses of mar-
ket structure, we calculate a Herﬁndahl index based alternatively on the
concentration of students by district and by school across the metropolitan
areas.13 As Hoxby (2000) points out, the Herﬁndahl index is itself endoge-
nously determined by the location decisions of families. Any movement of
families into better districts within a metropolitan area will change the
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11. Note that the direction of any bias is ambiguous. Negative or positive shocks that pre-
cipitate a move may aﬀect performance prior to the move as much as or even more than per-
formance following a move. The range of responses and the eﬀects over time are discussed in
Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2001a).
12. Inter-metropolitan area diﬀerences in the price of education quality raise serious doubts
about the validity of expenditure variables as measures of real diﬀerences in resources. Such
diﬀerences result from cost-of-living diﬀerences, variability in working conditions, and diﬀer-
ences in alternative employment opportunities for teachers, as well as other factors.
13. The Herfindahl index is the sum of squared proportions of students (by district or
school) for the MSA. A value of one indicates all students in a single location (no competition),
whereas values approaching zero show no concentration and thus extensive competition.value of the Herﬁndahl index, raising it if families concentrate in larger
districts and lowering it if families move to smaller districts, as would be the
case with urban ﬂight. In essence, the Herﬁndahl index reﬂects both the
initial administrative structure of schools and districts as well as within-
metropolitan area variation in school or district quality. Only the former
provides a good source of variation, and that is the source of variation
Hoxby attempts to isolate with her instrumental variable approach, which
deals with the endogeneity of school districts. We do not have available in-
struments, so the second source of variation may introduce bias of an inde-
terminate direction. 
The identiﬁcation of the relevant education market (i.e., deﬁning the ap-
propriate set of schools from which parents choose) also presents a diﬃcult
task. It is certainly the case that a number of families who work in an MSA
choose to live outside the MSA, and thus measuring school competition us-
ing the census deﬁnitions of MSAs almost certainly introduces some mea-
surement error in the calculation of the Herﬁndahl index that would tend to
bias downward the estimated eﬀects of competition.
Results
Figures 1.1and 1.2plot the metropolitan area school quality ﬁxed eﬀects
against the Herﬁndahl index, the measure of competition.14 The estimates
of school quality are obtained from student ﬁxed eﬀect regressions of
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Fig. 1.1 School quality and district concentration
14. Average enrollments in ﬁfth and sixth grade for the three years of data are used to con-
struct the Herﬁndahl index. The district (school) Herﬁndahl index is the sum of squared pro-
portions of enrollment in each district (school).34 Eric A. Hanushek and Steven G. Rivkin
achievement gain on twenty-seven metropolitan area dummy variables and
controls for free lunch eligibility, community type, and whether the student
moved prior to the grade. The ﬁve largest metropolitan areas are speciﬁ-
cally identiﬁed in the ﬁgures. Figure 1.1 measures competition by the con-
centration of students into school districts, whereas ﬁgure 1.2 measures
competition by the concentration of students into schools, implicitly per-
mitting competition to occur both within and across districts. The overall
patterns presented in ﬁgures 1.1 and 1.2 do not reveal a strong positive re-
lationship between competition at either the district or school level and
school quality. Rather, the scatter of points moves roughly along a horizon-
tal line regardless of whether competition is measured at the school or dis-
trict level. Not surprisingly, the coeﬃcient on Herﬁndahl index from a re-
gression of the metropolitan area ﬁxed eﬀect on the Herﬁndahl index is
small and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero regardless of whether com-
petition is measured at the school or district level (table 1.2).15 Note that
competition varies far less when measured at the school level, because any
dominance of large districts is ignored.
In contrast to the lack of an overall positive relationship between com-
petition and school quality, the school ﬁxed eﬀects for the ﬁve largest met-
ropolitan areas suggest the presence of a positive relationship between
school quality and competition: the ordering of Dallas, Houston, San An-
tonio, Fort Worth, and Austin according to school quality exactly matches
Fig. 1.2 School quality and school concentration
15. All regressions are weighted by the number of students in each metropolitan area in the
ﬁrst-stage regressions.the ordering by competition regardless of how competition is measured.
This is conﬁrmed by the regression results in table 1.2 that allow for sepa-
rate slope coeﬃcients for the ﬁve largest MSAs. Although there is little or
no evidence that competition at the school or district level is signiﬁcantly re-
lated to school quality for the smaller MSAs, the competition eﬀect is pos-
itive and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level for the ﬁve largest metropolitan
areas. Because some of the smaller MSAs in Texas actually get quite small
and oﬀer far fewer choices of districts (see table 1.1), it would not be sur-
prising if the incentive eﬀects of competition were much weaker in compar-
ison to the eﬀects in the large MSAs. Eﬀective competition may require a
minimum range of housing and public service quality (Tiebout 1956).
Regardless of MSA size, however, competition should have its sharpest
eﬀects on reducing ineﬃciencies in resource use and education production.
In a coarse eﬀort to isolate competition eﬀects on eﬃciency, the ﬁrst-stage
regressions underlying ﬁgures 1.3 and 1.4 include average class size as a
control for resource diﬀerences. Not surprisingly, given the strong evidence
that class size and other resource diﬀerences explain little of the total vari-
ation in school quality, the inclusion of class size has little impact on either
the observed patterns in the ﬁgures or the Herﬁndahl index coeﬃcients (see
table 1.3).
All in all, the ﬁgures and regression results suggest that competition im-
proves school quality in larger areas with substantial numbers of school and
district choices. However, a sample size of twenty-seven with only ﬁve very
Does Public School Competition Aﬀect Teacher Quality? 35
Table 1.2 Relationship between MSA Average School Quality and Competition, by MSA Size
Competition Competition
between Districts between Schools
All Areas By Area Size All Areas By Area Size
Herﬁndahl index 0.11 0.82
(1.43) (1.24)
Herﬁndahl index   large MSAa –1.07 –17.3
(2.76) (–2.53)
Herﬁndahl index   (1 – large MSA) 0.09 0.16
(1.01) (0.18)
Large MSA 0.11 0.03
(1.82) (0.69)
R2 0.08 0.36 0.06 0.31
Notes: All regressions use the estimated average quality of the MSA schools from equation (1). Observa-
tions are weighted by students in the MSAs. T-statistics are presented below each coeﬃcient. For com-
petition between districts, Herﬁndahl index is deﬁned by proportionate shares of students across districts.
For competition between schools, Herﬁndahl index is deﬁned by proportionate shares of students across
schools.
aInteraction of Herﬁndahl index and dummy variable for the ﬁve largest MSAs (Houston, Dallas, Ft.
Worth, San Antonio, and Austin).36 Eric A. Hanushek and Steven G. Rivkin
Fig. 1.3 School eﬃciency and district concentration
large MSAs is quite small, and there may simply not be enough variation to
identify more precisely the eﬀect of competition on average school quality
and eﬃciency. Moreover, although the matched panel data remove many of
the most obvious sources of bias, the limited number of time-varying char-
acteristics may fail to control for all confounding family and student inﬂu-
ences.
Fig. 1.4 School eﬃciency and school concentration1.3.3 Competition and Teacher Quality
The suggestive results for the eﬀects of competition on overall quality
leave uncertainty about the strength of the Tiebout forces. This portion
of the empirical analysis investigates a much narrower question with a
methodology that likely does a far better job of controlling for confounding
influences on student outcomes. Although the quality of teaching is only
one of many possible determinants of school quality, evidence in Rivkin,
Hanushek, and Kain (2001) strongly suggests that it is the most important
factor. Consequently, it would be highly unlikely that competition would
exert a strong eﬀect on school quality without aﬀecting the quality of
teachers.
At ﬁrst glance the problem might appear to be quite simple: More com-
petitive areas should lead schools to hire better teachers as measured by
teacher education, experience, test scores, and other observable character-
istics. However, two issues complicate any simple analysis: (a) evidence
overwhelmingly shows that observable characteristics explain little of the
variation in teacher quality in terms of student performance (see Hanushek
1986, 1997); and (b) competition could lead schools to raise teacher quality
per dollar spent but not the level of quality, and it is quite diﬃcult to ac-
count for cross-sectional diﬀerences in the price of teacher quality.
Isolating the contributions of teachers to between-school or between-
district diﬀerences in student performance is inherently very diﬃcult. Given
the added diﬃcult task of accurately capturing cross-sectional diﬀerences
in the price of teacher quality, we do not believe that an analysis of the eﬀect
of competition on teacher quality per dollar in salary is likely to produce
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Table 1.3 Relationship between MSA Average School Eﬃciency and Competition, 
by MSA Size
Competition Competition
between Districts between Schools
All Areas By Area Size All Areas By Area Size
Herﬁndahl index 0.11 0.83
(1.44) (1.26)
Herﬁndahl index   large MSAa –1.07 –17.2
(2.27) (–2.51)
Herﬁndahl index   (1 – large MSA) 0.09 0.18
(1.01) (0.19)
Large MSA 0.11 0.03
(1.80) (0.69)
R2 0.08 0.36 0.06 0.31
Notes: See notes to table 1.2. School quality is adjusted for resources (class size).
aInteraction of Herﬁndahl index and dummy variable for the ﬁve largest MSAs (Houston, Dallas, Ft.
Worth, San Antonio, and Austin).compelling evidence. We pursue a very diﬀerent empirical approach focus-
ing on the within-school and -district variations in the quality of teaching,
using the methodology developed in Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2001).
In essence, our approach here examines the link between competition
and the variance in teacher quality, testing the hypothesis that more com-
petition should lead to less variance in the quality of teaching within
schools and districts. Lower variance would result if competition pushes
schools to hire the most qualiﬁed applicants and to be more aggressive in
pushing teachers to perform better and in dismissing teachers who do not
teach well. Schools not facing much competition would be free to pursue
other considerations in hiring and to avoid potentially unpleasant retention
decisions and serious monitoring.
Consider a job search framework in which ﬁrms diﬀer in the extent to
which they maximize proﬁts (student outcomes such as achievement in the
case of schools). Firms facing few competitive pressures in which man-
agement cannot capture residual proﬁts would probably not place much
emphasis on teacher quality in making personnel decisions. Rather, other
aspects of teachers might play a more important role. If these other char-
acteristics are not highly correlated with those related to instructional qual-
ity, the variance in instructional quality would be quite large. Firms fac-
ing substantial competitive pressures, on the other hand, would probably
place much more emphasis on characteristics related to instructional qual-
ity. The variation in quality at each ﬁrm would be much smaller as manage-
ment attempted to hire and retain the best staﬀ possible given the level of
compensation.
Such factors suggest that quality variation within schools or districts in
part reﬂects administrator commitment to instructional quality. Notice that
schools with low salaries and poor working conditions will be likely to at-
tract lower-quality teachers than other schools despite the best attempts of
administrators. It is not that variance measures quality; rather, it is the case
that the variance in instructional quality should decline the stronger the
commitment to such quality.
The linkage between competition and the variance in teacher quality re-
ﬂects two underlying assumptions. First, improving the quality of teachers
is primarily achieved by hiring and retention decisions for teachers. Second,
because of the incentives, average quality will not decline while a teaching
force with a more homogeneous impact on student performance is selected.
If competition leads schools to concentrate on the hiring and retention of
better teachers, the prior arguments suggest that the variance in teacher
quality will also decline. However, teacher quality may also be raised by in-
creased eﬀort or an improvement in the skills of teachers through in-service
training. Such skill or eﬀort improvements have a more ambiguous eﬀect on
the within-school or -district variance in teacher quality, because the eﬀect
depends on where attention is focused or is most eﬀective. Holding constant
38 Eric A. Hanushek and Steven G. Rivkinthe distribution of teachers in a school, increases in the eﬀort or skill
(through training) of teachers initially at the lower end of the skill distribu-
tion would unambiguously reduce variance.16 Moreover, as long as eﬀort
and skill are not negatively correlated, policies aimed at increasing eﬀort at
the bottom of the eﬀort distribution would generally reduce the variance in
teacher quality. On the other hand, if policies to increase eﬀort or to pro-
vide eﬀective in-service training were to exert larger impacts at the upper
end of the initial skill distribution, the variance could be raised. We believe,
based on past research of the ineﬃcacy of teacher development programs
and additional education, that there is more support for the teacher selec-
tion route than for the eﬀort or development route as a way to increase
teacher quality. Nonetheless, we cannot rule out that there is some poten-
tial for a lessened eﬀect of competition on the variance in teacher perfor-
mance to the extent that the latter approaches are employed, are eﬀective,
and have a larger impact at the top of the skill distribution.
Although it is possible that schools move to more homogeneous but
lower quality with competition, this movement seems very unlikely in a sys-
tem that also emphasizes accountability, as the Texas system does. Com-
mon conceptual models of school behavior, even those based on nonmaxi-
mizing approaches, would generally not support a lessened variance with a
lower mean from competition.
The within-school variance in teacher quality, measured in terms of the
student achievement distribution, is estimated from year-to-year changes in
average student test score gains in grades ﬁve and six.17We hypothesize that
teacher turnover should lead to greater variation in student performance
diﬀerences among cohorts if there is less competition. This would result
from the inferior personnel practices of schools facing little competition,
which would increase both the variance of the quality of new hires and the
variance of the quality of teachers retained following the probationary pe-
riod. Of course, other factors that contribute to diﬀerences across cohorts
might be systematically related to teacher turnover and competition, and
we take a number of steps to control for such confounding inﬂuences.
The methodology and identifying assumptions are described in detail
in Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2001) and are only summarized here.
Throughout, we look only at within-school variance in teacher quality and
ignore any between-school variance. This approach, while giving a lower
bound on teacher quality diﬀerences, avoids any possible contamination of
family selection of schools. In order to sort out teacher quality eﬀects from
other things that might be changing within a school, we concentrate on the
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16. This impact would be consistent with the focus of many in-service programs on remedi-
ation or improving basic teaching skills.
17. We concentrate on grade average achievement largely because the data do not permit us
to link students with individual teachers, but also to avoid problems of within-grade sorting of
students and teachers.divergence of patterns of achievement gains across cohorts for each school.
The idea behind the estimation is that the pattern of achievement gains
across grades and cohorts of students within a school should remain con-
stant (except for random noise) if diﬀerences among individual students are
taken into account and if none of the characteristics of the school (teachers,
principal, curriculum, etc.) change. When teachers change, however, varia-
tions in teacher quality will lead to a divergence of achievement patterns
over time. We then relate systematic changes in teachers and in other as-
pects of schools to any changes in the pattern of achievement gains that are
observed.
The basic framework regresses the between-cohort variance in school
average test score gains on the proportion of teaching positions occupied
by new people in successive years. The dependent variable generally an-
alyzed is 
(2) [( A  c
6s    A  c
5s)   ( A  c  6s    A  c  5s)]2.
Each term in this expression involves the average growth in achievement
( A) for a given grade (ﬁve or six) and a given cohort (c or c ) in a speciﬁc
school (s). This measure focuses on the pattern of achievement changes and
how it diﬀers across cohorts. The term can be interpreted as the degree that
achievement patterns diverge over time: If nothing changes in the grade pat-
tern of achievement across cohorts, this term will be zero.
Intuitively, if teacher quality diﬀerences are important, high turnover of
teachers should lead to more variation in teacher quality over time; this
should show up in lack of persistence of student gains across cohorts.18 To
be precise, if no teachers in a school change and if the eﬀectiveness of teach-
ers is constant across adjacent years, teachers would add nothing to the di-
vergence of achievement patterns across cohorts. On the other hand, if all
of the teachers change and if teachers are randomly selected into schools,
the divergence of achievement across cohorts would reﬂect the underlying
variance in teacher quality. Our estimation strategy formalizes these no-
tions and shows that there is a precise relationship between achievement
changes as in equation (2) and the proportion of teachers who are diﬀerent
between years of observation (given the prior assumptions). In general, if
the assumptions are violated, it would imply that we have underestimated
the variation in achievement. In looking at the eﬀects of competition, the
most likely eﬀect is that any eﬀects of competition will be underestimated.19
To control for other inﬂuences on the variation in cohort performance,
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18. Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2001) show that the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on
teacher turnover has a simple interpretation. It equals four times the within-school variance in
teacher quality.
19. The exception would be if the teacher development/eﬀort models were dominant and if
the cost-eﬀective response of school districts is to emphasize the top of the existing distribu-
tion of teachers—something that we believe is unlikely.the regressions also standardize for the inverse of the number of teachers in
the grade,20the inverse of student enrollment, and a dummy variable for one
of the cohort comparisons. We also restrict the sample to students who re-
main in the same school for both grades, eﬀectively removing ﬁxed student
eﬀects.21 Some regressions also remove school or even school-by-grade
ﬁxed eﬀects, identifying eﬀects on competition by diﬀerences in the rate of
teacher turnover between the 1993 and 1994 cohorts and the 1994 and 1995
cohorts.
Finally, we aggregate across the teachers and classrooms within each
grade of each school. Aggregation overcomes what is possibly the largest
form of selection within schools: that which occurs when parents maneuver
their children toward speciﬁc, previously identiﬁed teachers or when prin-
cipals pursue purposeful classroom placement policies. Looking at overall
grade diﬀerences, which is equivalent to an instrumental variable estimator
based on grade rather than classroom assignment, circumvents this within-
grade teacher selection.
The new contribution of this work is the introduction of competition into
the analysis in the form of an interaction between the proportion of teach-
ers who are diﬀerent and the Herﬁndahl index for the MSA. If competition
works to reduce the within-school or within-district variance in teacher
quality, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term should be positive. (Because
variation over time in the Herﬁndahl index is not used, the main eﬀect of the
index cannot be identiﬁed in the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcations, so it is not in-
cluded.) 
The fact that districts exert substantial control over teacher hiring sug-
gests that it is the competition between districts that should have the
strongest inﬂuence on teacher quality. However, there are a number of rea-
sons to believe that the competition should be measured at the school level.
First, principals exert a great deal of control over hiring, retention, and
monitoring; second, within-district variation in working conditions in the
absence of ﬂexible salaries could lead to substantial variation in quality;
and, third, on the practical side, the methodology depends on variation in
the proportion of new teachers divided by the number of teachers. In dis-
tricts with many teachers, high values of the denominator overwhelm any
variation in teacher turnover, and it may preclude detecting the eﬀects of
variations in quality. Nevertheless, for completeness, the empirical analysis
measures competition at both the school and district level.
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20. The proportion of teachers who are diﬀerent must be divided by the number of teachers
in a school because of the aggregation to grade averages. The total within-school variance in
teacher quality includes not only variation across grades but also variation within grades. The
variance of grade averages equals the total variance divided by the number of teachers per
grade as long as the hiring process is identical for adjacent cohorts and grades.
21. Some speciﬁcations (not reported here) include controls for new principals and new su-
perintendents. Each may directly aﬀect the variation in achievement and be correlated with
teacher turnover. However, the results are quite insensitive to the inclusion of these variables.It is important to note that extensive teacher sorting among schools and
districts on the basis of teacher quality could make it diﬃcult to disentan-
gle any behavioral eﬀects of additional competition from a reduction in the
average metropolitan area within-school variance in teacher quality that
followed structurally from reducing teacher concentration in schools or dis-
tricts. Compare the cases of three equally sized districts and four equally
sized districts where teachers are sorted into a perfect quality hierarchy
across districts. If teachers are drawn from the same initial distribution in
both areas, the additional district will mechanically lead to smaller within-
school variance. However, evidence from Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain
(2001) suggests that sorting of teachers on the basis of quality may in fact
be quite limited in many areas. Work by Ballou (1996) and Ballou and
Podgursky (1997) documents teacher hiring practices in which applicant
skill does not play a primary role. Moreover, we have very little information
about the nature of the teacher quality pool, but one would expect compet-
itive pressures to change the hiring practices regarding where teachers are
drawn from the overall distribution of skills in the labor market.
Nevertheless, the possibility remains that a lower Herﬁndahl index may
be associated with more extensive sorting without inducing a behavioral
change. In an eﬀort to address this issue, we divide metropolitan areas up
into separate school markets on the basis of student income, under the as-
sumption that an expansion in the number of wealthy districts, while per-
mitting increased teacher sorting, does not eﬀectively increase the number
of choices for poor children and vice versa. A ﬁnding that income-speciﬁc
competition measures are more strongly related to the within-school vari-
ance in teacher quality than the overall competition measure would support
the belief that competition induces a behavioral response.
Results
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 report the main results on the eﬀects on variations in
teacher quality of school and district competition, respectively.22 The focus
of attention is the interaction of the proportion of diﬀerent teachers and the
Herﬁndahl index. The main eﬀect for the within-school variance in teacher
quality is the proportion of diﬀerent teachers divided by the number of
teachers, and the interaction term identifies how the variance in teacher
quality is aﬀected by diﬀerent degrees of competition within metropolitan
areas. Consistent with expectations, the estimates in table 1.4 using school-
level competition are much more precise. No interaction coeﬃcients using
district competition are signiﬁcant even at the 10 percent level.
The school competition results support the hypothesis that competition
raises school quality through its eﬀect on teacher personnel practices. All
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22. The sample is restricted to schools with at least ten students in a grade, and the results
are somewhat sensitive to this assumption.interaction terms are positive and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, even in
the speciﬁcation that includes school-by-grade ﬁxed eﬀects. In other words,
less competition leads to a larger within-school variance in teacher quality.
The magnitude of the interaction coeﬃcients in the ﬁxed eﬀects model sug-
gests that a one standard deviation increase in the degree of competition (a
0.02 point decline in the Herﬁndahl index) would reduce the within-school
variance of teacher quality by roughly 0.09 standard deviations in the
teacher quality distribution.
Although this eﬀect size might appear small, it is in fact large relative to
that of measured inputs such as class size. Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain
(2001) ﬁnd that a one standard deviation reduction in class size (roughly
three students per class) would lead to an increase in achievement of 0.02 of
a standard deviation. In other words, eﬀect sizes for class size reduction are
between one-fourth and one-ﬁfth as large as the eﬀect size for competition
and teacher quality.
Importantly, a metropolitan area-wide variable may provide a noisy mea-
sure of competition for most students and be susceptible to the structural
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Table 1.4 Estimated Eﬀect of Math Teacher Turnover on the Squared Diﬀerence in
School Average Test Score Gains Between Cohorts (absolute value of
t-statistics in parentheses)
No School  School-by-Grade
Fixed Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects
% math teachers diﬀerent/# teachers 0.013 0.036 0.039
(0.85) (2.58) (1.46)
% diﬀerent/# teachers   school 1.35 1.18 2.05
Herﬁndahl Index (2.60) (2.38) (2.01)
N 1,140 1,140 1,140
Notes: See text and Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2001) for a description of the speciﬁcation
and estimation approach. All regressions control for the inverse of student enrollment and re-
strict the sample to students remaining in the same school.
Table 1.5 Estimated Eﬀect of Math Teacher Turnover on the Squared Diﬀerence in
District Average Test Score Gains between Cohorts (absolute value of
t-statistics in parentheses)
No School  School-by-Grade
Fixed Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects
% math teachers diﬀerent/# teachers –0.040 –0.030 0.100
(1.55) (1.38) (1.91)
% diﬀerent/# teachers   school 0.11 0.06 –0.28
Herﬁndahl Index (1.25) (0.93) (1.56)
N 832 832 832
Notes: See notes to table 1.4.problems described earlier. Although the estimation cannot be easily di-
vided in terms of individual high- and low-income students, it is neverthe-
less informative to focus on schools serving a large proportion of low-
income students and those serving a small proportion. Therefore we divide
the sample into schools in which at least 75 percent of students are eligible
for a subsidized lunch and those in which fewer than 25 percent are so eli-
gible (the middle category is excluded) and compute two Herﬁndahl indexes
for each metropolitan area.
Table 1.6 reports the results for these two samples of schools. The results
suggest that public school competition is much more important for lower-
income students, for whom the interaction coeﬃcients are positive and
strongly signiﬁcant. In contrast, the estimates for schools with very few
lower-income students are small and statistically insigniﬁcant. To the extent
that private school alternatives are much more relevant and place much
more pressure on schools serving middle- and upper-middle-class students,
this result is not altogether surprising, and it is consistent with the belief
that the observed eﬀects capture a behavioral response. At the very least,
more should be learned about competition eﬀects for lower-income and mi-
nority students, because most of the large urban districts in the country
serve increasingly lower income populations.
In summary, these results provide support for the notion that competi-
tion aﬀects teacher quality. Importantly, the inferences drawn about qual-
ity from estimates of eﬀects on within-school variance rest upon the as-
sumption that administrators do not systematically act to ensure the
highest quality of teaching possible. Evidence from Ballou and Podgursky
(1995) and Ballou (1996) of school hiring decisions not driven primarily by
applicant quality supports the view that there is a great deal of slack in the
hiring process. Moreover, the small number of teachers released on the ba-
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Table 1.6 Estimated Eﬀect of Math Teacher Turnover on the Squared Diﬀerence in School
Average Test Score Gains between Cohorts, by School Demographics (absolute
value of t-statistics in parentheses)
Schools with >75% Eligible for Schools with <25% Eligible for
Subsidized Lunch Subsidized Lunch
No School School-by- No School School-by-
FixedF ixed Grade Fixed Fixed Fixed Grade Fixed
Eﬀects Eﬀects Eﬀects Eﬀects Eﬀects Eﬀects
% math teachers different/ 0.006 0.044 0.060 0.110 0.053 0.056
# teachers  (0.23) (1.61) (1.15) (2.90) (1.55) (0.94)
% diﬀerent/# teachers   school 1.15 0.97 1.19 –0.18 –0.08 0.06
Herﬁndahl Index (2.50) (3.71) (2.11) (1.07) (0.55) (0.21)
N 306 306 306 272 272 272
Notes: See notes to table 1.4.sis of poor performance and anecdotal evidence of weak eﬀorts by many
teachers are consistent with lax monitoring procedures.
On the other hand, the positive coeﬃcient on the interaction term could
reflect the fact that schools in more competitive metropolitan areas hire
more systematically but not any better than others—that is, that they hire
more similar teachers but not ones of higher quality. Because it is not pos-
sible to identify the part of the variation in which the decline in variation
is concentrated, statistical evidence cannot be brought to bear on this
question. However, to the extent that alternative job opportunities tend to
thin out or even truncate the right side of the distribution, it is quite likely
that the reduction in variance occurs predominantly in the left tail. More-
over, there is little a priori reason to support the hypothesis that competi-
tion leads to more systematic but not necessarily any better personnel
practices.
1.4 Conclusions
These results provide the ﬁrst piece of evidence on the mechanisms
through which competition may aﬀect school quality; they suggest that
more competition tends to increase teacher quality, particularly for schools
serving predominantly lower-income students. Given the evidence that
teacher quality is an important if not the primary determinant of school
quality, a ﬁnding that competition was not related to the quality of teaching
would have raised doubts about the strength of the link between competi-
tion and overall school quality.
Future work in this area should explore speciﬁc aspects of the teacher/
management relationship such as hiring, tenure, and monitoring, as well as
the eﬀects of competition on the use of inputs and other aspects of school
operations. Such information will provide a much better understanding of
the processes that generate the observed link between competition and
school quality. It is also relevant for eﬀorts to improve the existing public
schools.
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